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ABSTRACT
In this paper we develop a two-country global monetary econ-
omy where a monetary equilibrium exists because of funda-
mental decentralized trade frictions – a Lagos-Wright search
and matching friction. In the decentralized markets (DM), the
terms of trade can be determined either by bargaining or by
competitive price taking (baseline model). We show that the
baseline model is capable of generating quite realistic real and
nominal exchange rate volatility observed in the data, with-
out relying on more ad-hoc sticky price assumptions commonly
used in the international macroeconomics literature. The key
mechanism lies in the role of search and matching frictions and
a primitive technological assumption – that capital is also a
complementary input to production in the DM. This creates an
internal propagation mechanism by modifying asset-pricing re-
lations and relative price dynamics in the model.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that the real and nominal exchange rate of the world’s largest
economies are very volatile and persistent. The seminal work of Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan [2002] explored whether these features of the data could be un-
derstood in the context of a standard two country real business cycle model with
sticky prices. They concluded that such models can explain the volatility of the
real exchange rate but that they can not match its persistence. In a nutshell, ad-
hoc sticky price models are able to generate volatile real and nominal exchange
rate processes, because, by assumption prices are made to not adjust too quickly to
aggregate shocks. In an open economy, the nominal exchange rate and therefore,
the real exchange rate, have to overreact. This is a manifestation of the textbook
Dornbusch [1976] exchange rate overshooting hypothesis.
In this paper, we revisit this literature and ask if a perfectly ﬂexible price, two-
country, searchtheoreticmodelofmoneyalongthelinesofLagosandWright[2005]
and Aruoba, Waller, and Wright [2008], is capable of explaining real and nominal
exchange rate dynamics. This question is necessarily quantitative. We then explore
how the underlying search and matching friction, and, a capital complementarity
effect in the decentralized market production, help to generate the dynamic fea-
tures of the exchange rates in the model. These aspects of the model are arguably
more primitive than assuming exogenous sticky prices. The former (search and
matching friction) relates to an inherent feature of market incompleteness in the
sense of missing Walrasian markets and a resultant spatial-temporal friction, whilst
the latter pertains to a standard description of primitive technology– i.e. capital be-
ing used in a two sector-economy. In the search and money literature very little
focus has been placed on the quantitative and therefore potential policy relevance
of the theories put forward. A model must be empirical plausible ﬁrst, before it can
be of policy relevance. Exceptions are Aruoba, Waller, and Wright [2008] (long run
empirical plausibility) and Aruoba [2010] (closed-economy business-cycles), where
respectively, the task has been to investigate the quantitative relevance of the most
recent generation of search and money models. We think our task, one of quan-
titatively validating the search-theoretical foundation for international monetary
economics, is an important one to undertake, given the nature of openness of large
economies to trade and capital ﬂows today.
By attempting to capture a slightly deeper friction – as a stand-in for anonymity
(or absence of contractual enforcement) and lack of double coincidence of wants –
that generate a role for money, we can study the impact of different roles for moneySEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 3
on the evolution on the exchange rate. In particular, we consider an environment
whereagentsparticipateinsequentialmarkets, ﬁrstinadecentralizedmarket(DM)
where they trade specialized consumption goods bilaterally and then in a central-
ized Walrasian market (CM) where they trade general consumption goods, which
require domestic and foreign inputs, and assets, capital and bonds. Physical cap-
ital is a factor of production in both markets. Demand for money arises because
the particular frictions in the decentralized markets require a medium of exchange.
Moreover, money in this type of environment also provides a store of value and
precautionary function since agents face individual uncertainty before trading in
the DM.
Quantitatively, we calibrate our models to quarterly data representing the U.S.
and the rest of the world. We ﬁnd that, without even resorting to exogenous sticky-
price assumptions, the baseline model is capable of generating very volatile but
moderately persistent real and nominal exchange rates. Empirically, Steinsson
[2008] showed that the real exchange rate has hump-shaped dynamics. He then
showed that a standard sticky price model and its variations cannot replicate this
fact, without introducing exogenous real shocks such as a Phillips curve shock. In
constrast, our baseline search model is capable of producing hump-shaped dynam-
ics in the real exchange rate, without relying on additional exogenous real shocks.
This strong internal propagating mechanism of our model contributes to the equi-
librium persistence of the real exchange rate. The models are also capable of gen-
erating the observation that the real exchange rate is more volatile than U.S. GDP.
We show in this paper that a key mechanism that results in the volatility and
persistence of the exchange rates is the basic Lagos and Wright [2005]-type search
friction, indexed by a single parameter s. This feature introduces an explicit value
for money as medium of exchange, and, as a corrollary, it affects the precautionary
aspect of holding money. Using comparative impulse response analyses, we pro-
vide an explanation of how this return to money modiﬁes asset pricing relations
in an otherwise standard real-business-cycle model, and thus the exchange rates.
We also conduct a sensitivity analysis on the role of capital complementarity in DM
production in the model. This parameter is also key in controlling the volatility of
the exchange rate outcomes, as it restricts the asset-pricing relations in the model
by modifying the return on capital investment made in each CM.
Another interesting puzzle in equilibrium international business cycle models
is the perfectly positive correlation between relative consumption and the real ex-
change rate. In the data, this statistic tends to be slightly negative or zero. The4 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE
puzzle is attributed to the fact that with complete markets in equilibrium busi-
ness cycle models, there is a perfect link between a marginal rate of substitution
transform of relative consumption and the real exchange rate. However, even in
the sticky-price monetary models with incomplete markets of Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan [2002], this correlation remains at unity. However, in our model, the
correlation is no longer perfect. The reason behind this is the nature of the DM in
our model, which is akin to a nontraded goods sector.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline the details and as-
sumption of the baseline quantitative-theoretical model. We then work through
the equilibrium constructs and implications of the model in Section 3. Next, in Sec-
tion 4, we provide some insight into the key mechanisms in the model. We then
take the theory to the data in Section 5. We discuss the model’s business cycle fea-
tures relative to the data and other existing models in Section 6. We then explain
how the mechanisms interact to produce the business cycle features, by using the
partial tool of impulse response analysis, in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8.
2. BASELINE ENVIRONMENT: COMPLETE ASSET MARKETS IN THE CM
Consider a two-country model, each referred to as Home and Foreign. Vari-
ables and parameters without an asterisk (or with a subscript h) will refer to the
Home country, and those without an asterisk (or with a subscript f), will refer
to the Foreign country. Time is denumerable, and a time period is denoted by
t 2 N := f0,1,2,...g. Agents exist on a continuum [0,1] and have a common dis-
count factor b 2 (0,1). Each t 2 N is composed of two arbitrary sub-periods, night
and day. In the night, agents trade anonymously in bilateral random matches, in
decentralized markets (DM). In the day, agents trade in centralized markets (CM).
The nature of consumption, production and trade in each market will be explained
in detail in sections 2.5 and 2.6.
2.1. Preferences and DM technology. Let qb 2 R+ be an agent’s consumption (if
the agent is a buyer) and qs 2 R+ be an agent’s output (if the agent is a seller)
of a “specialized”, or, agent-speciﬁc and non-storable good in the DM. Similar to
Lagos and Wright [2005], an agent who is a producer of a qs is assumed to not value
it, but may, with probability s  1/2 exchange it (for money) with another agent
who, with symmetric probability s, wishes to consume it (a buyer) – i.e. it is a
qb to this buyer. Thus, with probability 1   2s, an agent will leave a DM with no
exchange. For simplicity, assume that “doble-coincidence-of-wants” events, whereSEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 5
buyers and sellers in the DM are able to barter and money is inessential, occur with
probability zero.
Let X 2 R+, k 2 R+ and H 2 [0, H], where H < +¥, denote consumption,
individual capital stock and labor in the CM, respectively. Agents’ per-period pref-





u(q) + U(X) + h(H) if buyer in current DM
 c(q,k) + U(X) + h(H) if seller in current DM
where u(q) is the per-period payoff from q if the agent is a buyer, c(q,k) is the cost
of producing q with ﬁxed within-period k determined in the previous CM. U(X) is
the immediate payoff from consuming X in the CM, and  h(H) is the disutility of
work effort in the CM. We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. The functions u,U,h : R+ ! R and c : R2
+ ! R have the following
properties:
(i) First and second derivatives exist everywhere: u,U 2 C2(R+) and c 2 C2(R2
+);
(ii) uq > 0, cq > 0, ck < 0, UX > 0 and hH > 0;
(iii) uqq < 0, cqq  0, cqk < 0, UXX  0 and hHH = 0;
(iv) u(0) = c(0,0) = 0; and
(v) u(q) > c(q,k) for every (q,k).
2.2. CM Technology. In the CM the ﬁnal good in the Home country is produced
according to a constant returns technology, (yh,yf) 7! G(yh,yf), where yh denotes
the input demand for an intermediate good produced in the home country, and,
yf represents the demand of a substitutable input produced in the foreign country.






+) and that Gi > 0,Gj > 0,Gii < 0,Gjj<0, and, F(i,0) = F(0, j) = 0, for
some inputs i, j.
Let K denote an aggregate capital stock in each home country. The production of
the different intermediate goods are given by another constant returns technology,
(K, H) 7! zF(K, H) which is subject to a stochastic productivity shock, z. Assume
(zt)t2N is a strictly positive and bounded stochastic process. Assume that F 2
C2(R2
+) and that FK > 0, FH > 0, FKK < 0, FHH<0, and, F(K,0) = F(0, H) = 0.
2.3. State variables. Let m 2 R+ be the stock of an agent’s local nominal money
holding in the Home country. 1 Denote b as the current stock of an internationally
1 It will be immediately apparent to the serious monetary theorist that we are placing an ad hoc
restriction that agents can only use the local currency to buy local goods, especially in the DM. We6 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE
traded complete state-contingent money claim, held by an agent in the Home coun-
try. Each b is denominated in the Home currency. Since these complete contingent
claims require knowledge of traders’ histories, it is natural that they are not issued
or traded in the DM with anonymous randomly matched trades. They are traded
only during each CM subperiod.
Suppose we relax the last assumption a little bit. Following Aruoba, Waller, and
Wright [2008], suppose that conditional on being a buyer or seller, the exogenous
probability that a buyer or seller would engage in an exchange where record keep-
ing is possible is (1   k) 2 [0,1]. That is, the event that a buyer or a seller can buy
or sell a good in the DM using credit occurs with the discrete probability measure
s(1 k). Since credit is assumed to be enforceable in such an event, a buyer is will-
ing to take (and a seller is willing to give) out the nominal loan l in exchange for a
good, say ˘ q. This loan is required to be repaid in full in the following CM. Thus
there is no complication with discounting given the timing of the sub-markets.
Then we let q denote a DM specialized good that is exchanged for money in events
where exchange occurs with measure sk for a buyer or seller.
Denote the vector of exogenous shocks as z 2 Z. For example, we consider
Home and Foreign, technology (z) and money growth (y), shocks. Thus z :=
(z,z,y,y), and Z  R4. Let the time-t aggregate (global) CM state vector rele-
vant to an agent in country i 2 fh, fg be s := (M, M,B,B,K,K,f,f,e,mh,mf,z),
consisting of, respectively, the global/aggregate Home and Foreign capital stocks,
the global Home and Foreign DM-speciﬁc capital stocks, the total Home and For-
eign holding of the state-contingent claims, Home and Foreign nominal money
stock, the value of money in the Home CM (f := 1/pX), the value of money in the
Foreign CM (f := 1/p
X), the nominal exchange rate in Home CM currency terms
(e), and, mi(,z) : Bi(z) ! [0,1] which is the time-t probability measure on the
Borel s-ﬁeld Bi(z) := B(R+  R  R+  R) generated by the product state space
appeal to observed facts that this is indeed what we see–one does not pay for a haircut in the United
States using the South Korean Won. Of course, what we expect to see in the model ought to be the
result of a possible equilibrium in an environment where agents are not a priori restricted to hold a
particular currency. One possible microfoundation lies in sellers’ unwillingless to accept a currency
they do not recognize [see e.g. Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright, 2008]. However, these explorations
are beyond the scope of this paper. We have nevertheless tried a version of the model where we
do not restrict trades of local goods to local currencies. In this case, the composition of each agent’s
currency portfolio, and therefore, the nominal exchange rate, will be indeterminate–i.e. we have
a stochastic version of Kareken and Wallace [1981]. Unfortunately, this less stringent version of the
model does not admit any stable rational expectations equilibrium, given a data consistent calibration
of the model.SEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 7
containing (m,b,k,l), for each vector of exogenous state variables, z.2 Also, let the
space of all such distributions be Pz(Bi), for each ﬁxed z.
At the beginning of the time-t DM, the aggregate (global) state vector for an agent
in country i 2 fh, fg is ˆ s := (M, M,B,B,K,K,f,f,e,nh,nf,z). The explicit
switch in notation from ni to mi takes into account that, in general, the distribution
of assets upon the economy i entering each period’s DM, ni, may be different to the
distribution mi upon its leaving the DM, and into the CM, in the same period.3
2.4. Timing. Figure 1 depicts the sequence of events within each t 2 N. The rel-
evant aggregate state vector s is realized at the beginning of each t. This is public
information for all agents. An agent in the Home country, ﬁrst entering the DM
with assets (m,b,k) respectively, money, bonds, and capital, given ˆ s, is publicly
known by the individual state (a, ˆ s) := (m,b,k,0, ˆ s). For simplicity, we make the
restriction that each country i agent does not hold another country’s currency as
asset.4 Since bilateral matches in the DM are random, agents within each country
i only know the state of their trade partners ex post. Ex ante they only know the
probability distribution of traders in the DM, which is (s,s,1   2s) with support
fBuyer,Seller, Neitherg. Conditional on either events fBuyerg or fSellerg, there is
an identical distribution fk,1 kg faced by the agent of a trade being either anony-
mous (monetary) or monitored (credit).






(m,b,k,l,s) w.p. 2s(1  k)
reﬂecting the possibility that money had changed hands as a result of the agent
being a buyer or seller. As a result of that, the distribution of assets (namely money)
would also have changed from ni 2 ˆ s to mi 2 s. The components (b,k) have not
changed since they are predetermined at the beginning of t. Thus, within t, the
agent enters the CM with possible state (a0,s). Agents do not discount payoffs
within each period t.
2Note that if Z = Æ, i.e. in the absence of aggregate exogenous shocks, then the solution of the
Markov equilibrium is characterized by a deterministic difference equation system, as in Lagos and
Wright [2005]. Also, note that the aggregate prices (f,f,e) are explicitly included as (auxiliary) state
variables, following Dufﬁe, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan [1994], so that we can restrict
our characterization of equilibria to stationary Markov equilibria.
3It is straightforward to prove that the probability measures ni for each i 2 fh, fg, is degenerate
in any equilibrium, as a stochastic extension to the original proof in Lagos and Wright [2004]. This
affords us plenty of tractability and ease of computation later.
4See Head and Shi [2003] for the environment where agents trade currency internationally.8 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE
t t + 1 DM*: V(m,b,k, ˆ s) CM*: W(a0,s)
t t + 1




FIGURE 1. Agents engage in domestic decentralized trades (DM)
over special goods during the night using money. During the day in
the centralized market (CM), they trade domestically a general good
which is not exported, and borrow or lend using nominal claims.
Note: (i) In the “complete markets” version of the CM, we have
(b+,b
+) := fb(a+,s+ja,s),b(a+,s+ja,s)g denoting a complete set
of money claims contingent on all measurable events fa+,s+g,
reachable from (a,s); and (ii) In the “incomplete markets” version
of the CM, we have (b+,b
+) := (b(s),b(s)) denoting single non-
contingent money claims payable in all continuation states (a+,s+).
In the next two sections we describe in detail the sub-period problems, DM and
CM, in a backward fashion. To economize on notation, we use the following con-
vention. A variable or vector with a “+” subscript will denote its time t + 1 con-
tingent outcome. A state with a “ ” subscript will denote its time t 1 realization.
However, in some cases, variables with a “+” subscript, such as capital and bonds,
are predetermined at the beginning of time t + 1. In such cases, these are decision
or control variables which will be made obvious in the problems below. The same
variable without the “+” subscript denotes its current or time-t realization.
2.5. Centralized markets. In the CM, an agent consumes a general good X 2 R+
which is produced using CM-speciﬁc labor H 2 R+ and capital k. In contrast to
Lagos and Wright [2005], we model a set of nominally complete state-contingent
claims issued by both countries. Agents in each country’s CM who consume more
(less) than their total wealth can also trade in these securities. Note that we do not
model international trade in ﬁnal consumption goods or intermediate inputs. ThisSEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 9
keeps the model manageable and more importantly, allows us to focus on the effect
of money and capital on the only channel for international linkage.
Let A > 0 be the constant marginal disutility of work effort. Let d 2 [0,1] be the
depreciation rate of capital and tK a proportional tax rate on capital income. Denote
r := r(s)  (1 tK)(˜ r(s) d) andr := r(s)  (1 tK)(˜ r(s) d) be, respectively,
the after-tax competitive rate of return to physical capital, ˜ r net of depreciation,
at Home and in the Foreign country. Similar, denote w(s) := (1   tH) ˜ w(s) as
the after-tax real wage rate. Finally, denote tX as the proportional tax rate on CM
consumption X.
Let m+ := m(a,s), k+ := k(a,s), and b+ := b(a,s), so that a+ = (m+,b+,k+,0).
Q(a+,s+ja,s) is the domestic price of one unit of the state-contingent claim with
nominal (ai+,s+)-contingent payoffs, i.e. b(a+,s+ja,s). Let f := f(s) = 1/pX(s)
and f := f(s) = 1/p
X(s) be the inverses of the prices of X (i.e. the value of a unit
of each currency), in the respective Home and Foreign countries.
At each t 2 N, a price-taking agent (at the beginning of the CM sub-period in











s+ = G(s,v+), v
i.i.d.  j (2)
(1+ tX)X(a,s) + k(a,s)   k   f(s)b + T(s)






where l(s,), for each given s, is induced by G  j, and deﬁnes an equilibrium
product probability measure over Borel-subsets containing ˆ s+. Constraint (2) de-
scribes a transition law, where the mapping G = Gfsgnfzg  Gfzg, with component
Gfsgnfzg inducing the z-dependent stochastic process for endogenous aggregate
states, fsg n fzg, is to be pinned down in equilibrium, and (z,v+) 7! Gfzg(z,v+)
is an exogenous map for the aggregate shocks. Implicit in the constraint (2) is the
equilibrium transition of the distribution of individual states from the period-t CM,10 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE
to the period-(t + 1) DM:
nh(ˆ s+,) = Gn [mh(s,),z+]. (4)
such that the relevant conditional distribution of assets at the beginning of the time-
(t + 1) CM subperiod is given by:
mh(s+,) = Gm [nh(ˆ s+,),z+]  Gm  Gn(s,z+). (5)
where Gm and Gn are components of Gfsgnfzg.
The sequence of state-contingent one-period budget constraints given by (3) say
the following: For each given state (m,b,k,s), consumption of the general good
X is to be ﬁnanced by the variation in real money holdings, by real labor income
wH, net of investment ﬂows to physical capital made in the CM, net of contingent
claims in real terms, and net of lump-sum government taxes, T.
2.5.1. Optimal individuals’ decisions in the CM. Eliminating H in (1) using the budget
constraint (3), the optimal decision rules satisfy the following conditions for every
state (a,s) and every measurable continuation state (a+, ˆ s+).
Theoptimaltrade-offbetweencurrentCMconsumption X andleisure H, given
the competitive real wage w := w(s), is




where the marginal utility of leisure is a constant A > 0. In what follows, note
that the derivative functions of V is determined in general equilibrium. The op-
timal trade-off between a current increase in marginal utility of X in the CM and
the present-value expected marginal value of entering the next-period DM with a






Vm+(m+,b+,k+,0, ˆ s+)l(s,dˆ s+). (7)
Similar to condition (7), conditions (8)-(9) below provide the optimal trade-offs be-
tween the current utility of consumption of X and the expected discounted mar-
ginal value of entering the DM with more assets. Speciﬁcally, the optimal choice of





= bVb+(m+,b+,k+,0, ˆ s+), (8)
which holds for every s, every ˆ s+, and implicitly, every s+.SEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 11
The optimal choice of the Home-produced capital stock available for production






Vk+(m+,b+,k+,0, ˆ s+)l(s,dˆ s+). (9)
2.5.2. Envelope conditions for W in the CM. At an optimum, the envelope conditions
for the agent’s CM decision problem are as follows. The marginal value of money










and the marginal value of holding the each of the four types of capital stocks at
the beginning of the CM are as follows. With respect to a Home agent’s holding of











The envelope conditions (10)-(13) imply that, W is linear in (m,b,k,l), for each ﬁxed
aggregate state s. So we can write W as




f(m + b) + (1+ r)k

. (14)
2.5.3. Firms. Let Ph be the Home currency price of the Home produced interme-
diate good, and Py be that of the Foreign produced intermediate good use by the






  Ph(s)yh(s)   Pf(s)yf(s)

.
The proﬁt-maximizing conditions are:
f(s)Ph(s) = Gyh[yh(s),yf(s)], (15)12 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE
and
f(s)Pf(s) = Gyf[yh(s),yf(s)]. (16)









where the market for inputs to F is perfectly competitive. Proﬁt maximization is
characterized by the usual ﬁrst order conditions where capital and labor are paid a
respective rental rate which equals their marginal products in every aggregate state
s:
˜ r(s) = f(s)Ph(s)  zFk[K(s ), H(s)], (17)
and






is aggregate labor supply in the Home CM.
Without loss of generality for the rest of the model, we shall assume that (zt)t2N
is induced by some Markov process to be described in the application later on. A
foreign country’s CM agent named (m,b,k,l,s) and its ﬁrm have a symmetric
problem to (1)-(3), (15)-(16), and (17)-(18).
2.6. Decentralized markets. At the beginning of the CM at each t 2 N, an agent
named (m,b,k,0, ˆ s) enters the DM.5 With a ﬁxed probability s this agent is the
buyer of the special good that some other agent produces, qb, where the other agent
(seller) is indexed by the state (˜ a, ˆ s) := ( ˜ m, ˜ b, ˜ k, ˆ s), but not vice-versa. With proba-
bility sk, the buyer parts with db “dollars” and realizes a payoff of u(qb) 2 R. The





s(1   k), the buyer does not use money, but takes out a nominal loan l, from the
seller he meets, and realizes a payoff of u(˘ qb) 2 R. The buyer then enters the day
CM with a value of W (m,b,k,l,s).
5Note that m implicitly includes any aggregate monetary transfer or injection from the govern-
ment, which we denote later as i(ˆ s), so then, m(ˆ s) = m(s ) + i(ˆ s).SEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 13
Symmetrically, with probability sk, agent (m,b,k, ˆ s) has a special good qs which
other buyers want to buy, but not vice-versa. This agent receives ds dollars in ex-
change for exerting a production cost of c(qs,k) 2 R+. Notice that capital obtained
from the previous period’s CM, k, accrues a return in the DM in the form of the
marginal beneﬁt to producing q (qs or ˘ qs), i.e. ck(q,k).6 This seller then enters the
day CM with a value of W (m + ds,b,k,s). With probability s(1   k), a seller may
sell ˘ qs by extending a loan l to a matched buyer.
These four events described above are known as single-coincidence-of-wants
meetings, where money is a portable medium of exchange in events that occur
with probability 2sk, and where credit l is the medium of exchange in events with
probability 2s(1   k). With probability 1   2s, agent (m,b,k, ˆ s) leaves the DM and
enters the day with his assets intact, and begins his activity in the CM with value
W(m,b,k,0,s). For simplicity, we assume the probability of a “double-coincidence”
meeting, and hence the occurrence of pure barter, is zero.
Formally, anagentnamed(m,b,k,0, ˆ s) hasavalueV(m,b,k,0, ˆ s) atthebeginning
of the DM that satisﬁes the following problem:
V(m,b,k,0, ˆ s) = sVb(m,b,k,0, ˆ s)








nh(d˜ a, ˆ s)
+ (1  k)
Z h








[ c(qs,k) + W (m + ds,b,k,0,s)]nh(d˜ a, ˆ s)
+ (1  k)
Z
[ c(˘ qs,k) + W (m,b,k, ls,s)]nh(d˜ a, ˆ s).
are the value functions of ex-post buyer and sellers respectively.
6This feature was ﬁrst introduced by Aruoba, Waller, and Wright [2008, Appendix A.1]. The
authors showed that whether there exist two kinds of capital goods, for use in the DM and in the CM
production, respectively, is of negligible quantitative consequence in their model.14 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE
2.6.1. Walrasian price taking. Consider a version where (qb,qs,db,ds, ˘ qb, ˘ qs,lb,ls) are






m   ˜ pqb,b,k,0,s
i
+ (1  k) max
˘ q2[0,lb/ ˘ p]
h





where db = ˜ pqb, and,
Vs(m,b,k,0) =k max
qs [ c(qs,k) + W (m + ds,b,k,0,s)]
+ (1  k)max
˘ qs [ c(˘ qs,k) + W (m,b,k, ls,s)],
where ˜ p and ˘ p are the respective prices of the special good, taken as given by all
buyers and sellers.
2.7. Monetary policy. New money supply is injected at the end of the period in
the CM.7 Speciﬁcally, the monetary authority follows a monetary supply rule:
M(s) = exp(y)M(s ), (20)
where expfyg 1 is the one-period money supply growth rate between time t and
t+1. Assume that (exp(yt))t2N follows a Markov process that lives in the compact
set [1, N], with N < +¥. We deﬁne this process later.
The monetary authority’s nominal budget constraint for each s is:
M(s) = i(s) + M(s ). (21)
Thus, aggregate money injection i(s) is given by:
i(s) = [exp(y)   1] M(s ).
Also, note that if we set exp(y) = 1 for all periods, then money supply remains
constant forever. In this case, i(s) = 0 for all s so no new money is injected into
the economy. Again, the Foreign country would have a symmetric description of
its government policy.
3. STATIONARY MARKOV MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we state a key result which is just an extension of Lagos and
Wright [2005] to environments with aggregate uncertainty. We claim here that in an
equilibrium, the endogenous distribution of agents’ asset holdings is degenerate at
7This is merely for mathematical convenience, so that within each DM, agents do not have to deal
with a stochastic total payoff function, W.SEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 15
the start of each period (and hence DM), such that all agents in each country choose
the same allocations that depend only on the global state. We further characterize
the equilibrium conditions in the DM and list the conditions for market clearing
in the CM. We then deﬁne the elements that constitute a stationary Markov mone-
tary equilibrium, which includes non-Walrasian or decentralized bilateral random
matches with alternative pricing mechanisms: Walrasian price-taking, generalized
Nash bargaining, and proportional bargaining.
In general, because of the memory-less random matching process in the DM,
we will need to track the history of aggregate distribution of assets held by agents
in any equilibrium where money has value. However, because of the quasi-linear
assumption on each agent’s per-period payoff function, it can be shown that in
equilibrium asset holdings at the beginning of each t 2 N are identical across all






for each i 2 fh, fg, for all ˆ s. This implies that we can explicitly write n(ˆ s,) as





1 if (m,b,k) = (M,B,K) 2 A
0 otherwise
.
However, we can see that even if ni(z,) is degenerate at the end of the CM, mi(z,)
is not. Thus, explicitly, agents at the beginning of each CM will still face an ag-
gregate state variable s that contains a non-degenerate distribution of individual
states. Speciﬁcally, the non-degeneracy is along the dimension of money holdings
out of the DM.
3.1. Walrasian Price Taking and equilibrium decisions. In equilibrium, the con-
straints d  m, and l  ˘ p˘ q bind, and qb = qs = q. Thus for the sk proportion of
agents who are sellers that meet buyers and they trade with money, we have the
equilibrium condition that the relative price of the special good in terms of the CM
ﬁnal good, is equal to the marginal cost of the DM seller:
Af
w
M = cq(q,K)q  g(q,K). (23)
Note that ˜ p = M/q in equilibrium.16 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE
For the s(1  k) proportion of buyers and sellers, we have:
Af
w
l = cq(˘ q,K)˘ q  g(˘ q,K). (24)
Since by assumption contracts are enforceable for these agents, then credit attains
the ﬁrst best allocation in terms of ˘ q satisfying
uq(˘ q) = cq(˘ q,K). (25)





3.2. EnvelopeconditionsforV intheDM. Ataninterioroptimumconsistentwith
equilibrium, we have the following envelope conditions. Utilizing the linearity of
W, the marginal value of money at the beginning of the DM is









The marginal value of the state-contingent money claims at the beginning of the
DM is




The DM marginal value of the capital stock, is
VK(M,B,K,0, ˆ s) =
Af
w
(1+ r)   skg(q,K)   s(1  k)g(˘ q,K) > 0, (29)
where
g(q,K) = cK(q,K) < 0. (30)
The function g is strictly negative due to two effects that capture the reduction
in marginal cost of production in the DM. The ﬁrst term on the right of (30) is the
indirect effect on marginal cost through the effect of an additional capital stock on
the terms of trade q.
This reﬂects the fact that parties to a monetary trade in the DM are not price
takers. The terms of trade determined by the bargaining solution thus takes into
account the seller’s stock of capital in the DM. The second term is the capital-effort
complementarity effect in the production of q in the sense that marginally more
capital stock reduces the cost of producing q.SEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 17
3.3. Market clearing in the CM. In an equilibrium, since agents within each coun-
try choose the same asset holdings, i.e. (m,b,k) = (M,B,K), then they do not
borrow from, or, lend to each other, only countries lend to each other. Therefore, in
the global equilibrium, state-contingent money claims by Home and Foreign have
zero excess demand:
B(s) + B(s) = 0. (31)
in every state s. The Home resource constraint is given by
G[yh(s),yf(s)] = X(s) + I(s) + Gd(s), (32)
where I(s) = K(s)   (1  d)K(s ) is domestic capital investment, and,
Gd(s) = [T(s) + (M(s)   M(s ))f(s)]
+ tXX(s) + tHH(s) + tK(˜ r(s)   d)K(s ).
The Foreign resource constraint is given by
G[y
f(s),y
h(s)] = X(s) + I(s) + Gd(s), (33)
where I(s) = K(s) (1 d)K(s ) is the Foreign country’s investment in its own
capital stock, and,
Gd(s) = [T(s) + (M(s)   M(s ))f(s)]
+ tXX(s) + tHH(s) + tK(˜ r(s)   d)K(s ).
Market clearing for the intermediate goods must hold:
zF[K(s ), H(s)] = yh(s) + y
h(s) (34)
zF[K(s ), H(s)] = y
f(s) + yf(s) (35)
Deﬁnition 1. A monetary stationary Markov equilibrium (SME), given any feasible mon-
etary policy rule (y,y), is a set of time-invariant maps consisting of
E1. strictly positive pricing functions (f,f,e) and (w,r,w,r,Q),
E2. transition laws (G, j) and (G, j),
E3. value functions V,W and V,W,
E4. CM decision rules (X,X,m,m,b,k,b,k), and
E5. DM terms of trade (decision rules), (d,q, ˘ q) and (d,q, ˘ q),
such that:18 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE
(1) given prices (E1), the value functions V and W satisfy the functional equations (1),
(2 ), (3), and (19) and symmetrically V,W solve the Foreign country counterpart
problems;
(2) given the value functions V and W, and prices (E1), the decision rules E4 solve
(1), (2 ), (3) in the CM, for the Home country and symmetrically for the Foreign
country, given V and W;
(3) Firms optimize: (17) and (18);
(4) given the value functions W and V, the decision rules E5 solve and (23), (25), and
(26) in the DM, and symmetrically for the Foreign country, given W;
(5) The government budget constraint (21) is satisﬁed for Home and symmetrically for
Foreign.
(6) Markets clear in the CM and CM*: (31), (32) and (33), where m = M, b = B and
k = K, and m = M, b = B and k = K.
4. EQUILIBRIUM ASSET-PRICING PROPERTIES
We are now in a position to gain further insights into the international asset pric-
ing properties of the model. The insight will be driven by the endogenous com-
plementarity effect of capital k on the production cost in the DM, measured by the
endogenous function g in equation (30). This g acts as an endogenous wedge in
equilibrium asset pricing conditions in the model.
For ease of notation and exposition, and without loss of generality, we set k = 1
for now and tX = tH = tK = 0. Using the ﬁrst-order conditions in the CM and
DM, the corresponding envelope conditions, and imposing equilibrium, we can
derive a set of stochastic Euler functional equations necessary for characterizing a
stationary Markovian equilibrium (SME). We can write the SME conditions as ones
that characterize the solutions as s-dependent processes. Recall that in any equi-
librium, agents end up choosing the same asset allocations regardless of their per-
sonal state. Thus, with a slight abuse of notation, we drop the dependency on
aggregate state variables such as mi(s,), i 2 fh, fg, from the deﬁnition of s in equi-
librium. In other words, the Euler equations below will have the appearance as
though they were—and indeed they are—characterizing equilibrium of some rep-
resentative agent model.
First, from (6), we can easily deduce that in equilibrium, X(a,s) = X(s) and
X(af,s) = X(s), for all s. Also, we have, in equilibrium, q(m, ˜ k,s) = q(M,K,s) 
q(s) and q(m, ˜ k,s) = q(M,K,s)  q(s). Together with (7) and (27), we have














tion l(s,), and, the term in the square brackets is the state-contingent one-period
nominal gross return on money holding. This return is made up of two terms: (i)
With measure 1   s, the positive one-for-one effect on the value of entering the
CM with more money holding in the case that the agent does not trade in the DM
net of the negative one-for-one effect on the value of entering the CM with less
money holding in the case that the agent spent his money holding as buyer; and
(ii) the positive marginal effect of money holding on utility of consumption via the
speciﬁc good q, conditional of the agent being a buyer with probability s. Alter-
natively, we can write (36) as an integral-functional equation solely in terms of the




























Second, since in equilibrium, X(a,s) = X(s) for all s, along with (8) and (28), we













Third, Foreign agents would also have a ﬁrst order condition for bonds similar to

















l(s,ds+), 8s,s+. (40)20 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE









































is ﬁxed. we can re-write the above expression in (43) as the equilibrium determina-







This warrants some remark. Up to this point, in terms of equilibrium complete
state-contingent money claims, we have derived a standard complete markets re-
sult for the nominal exchange rate [see e.g. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2002].
Speciﬁcally, what equation (44) says is that the nominal exchange rate, at each state
of the world, is proportional to the within-period the relative value of the marginal
rate of substitution of the general good between Home and Foreign consumers.
Intuitively, and quite obviously, in the absence of frictions, we will obtain similar
dynamics for the nominal exchange rate, x, as in the standard international real
business cycle model with money [see Schlagenhauf and Wrase, 1995].
However, we can show that in our model with monetary search friction and
capital complementarity in DM production, there exists an additional function that
acts as a connection between outcomes in the nontraded DM to the marginal utility
of X expressions, and thus, the nominal exchange rate x. To see this, we can insert
the conditions (41) and (42) into (44) to obtain a relationship between the nominalSEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 21






















More generally, the key mechanisms that makes the difference in our model are as
follows:
(1) The equilibrium price processes (f 1,(f) 1) that depend on the interac-
tion between DM and CM outcomes;
(2) The link between DM and CM which shows up as the additional return to
capital (encoded in the function g) and money (implicitly in the fact that
cqK < 0);
(3) and the interaction of these with DM market incompleteness (individual-
leveluncertainty), indexedbytheprobabilitiesfsk,sk,s(1 k),s(1 k),1 
2sg on the support fbuyer   money,seller   money,buyer   credit,seller  
credit,noneg.
These are well-understood in the search and money literature, but their implica-
tions for the international exchange rate business cycle dynamics have not been
explored. To understand what the model is capable of, we will next resort to a
calibration exercise to discipline the choice of parameterization.
4.2. Other variable deﬁnitions. Since the model features a DM sector that is akin
to a nontraded goods sector, we will need to deﬁne a relevant price index in order
to deﬁne a real exchange rate. Empirically, the relevant exchange rate will have
to a some measure of a broad index, such as The U.S. Federal Reserve Board of
Governor’s Broad Index used by Heathcote and Perri [2002]. First we deﬁne a DM
price index as the convex combination of the pricing outcome in monetary and
credit trades:
pDM := k ˜ p + (1  k) ˘ p.
The foreign counterpart will be p
DM. Denote the aggregate DM consumption as
qDM := kq + (1  k)˘ q.
Now we can deﬁne our measure of consumer price index as






is the CM consumption share in total domestic consumption. Note that this share is
time-varying in the sense that it is dependent on the aggregate state s. The foreign
CPI is deﬁned analogously as P







As a ﬁrst exercise, we consider a simpler pricing mechanism in the DM – Wal-
rasian price taking. We can show analytically that in this case, the SME nests a
unique non-stochastic steady state equilibrium.8 For our numerical experiments,
we consider the following speciﬁc functions to represent the model primitives. In




, zF(K, H) = zKaH1 a,
respectively, where B > 0, g > 0, and a 2 (0,1). The symmetric description holds
for the Foreign country. Note however, the notation for the ﬁnal goods production
























for the Foreign country, where J 2 (0,1) and  ¥  1/e  1. The elasticity of
substitution between the inputs to G is given by se = e/(e   1). These functional
forms are quite standard in models with international trade in intermediate goods
[see e.g. Heathcote and Perri, 2002; Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2002].
In the DM, preferences and technology are given respectively by
u(q) = C
(q + q)1 h   b1 h
1  h
, c(q,K) = qv(K)1 v
where C = 1 without loss of generality, q & 0 (b = 0 if DM trade is determined by
Walrasian price taking), h > 0 and v  1.
8Later, in the bargaining case, we have to rely on numerical methods to ﬁnd the non-stochastic
steady state solutions.SEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 23
Given these function, we can characterize the SME with either (i) DM bargaining
or (ii) DM Walrasian price taking assumptions on the pricing mechanism in DM
trades. As a ﬁrst pass, we will consider (ii) DM Walrasian price taking, since this
avoid additional sources of inefﬁciencies arising from bargaining (i.e. the holdup
problems on money and capital). More important, with DM Walrasian price taking,
we can ﬁrst focus on the role that capital complementarity plays in DM production
and its pure effect on the SME and real exchange rate dynamics. (Later, when
we incorporate the bargaining assumption, we can also see the additional effect of
bargaining holdups on capital and its resulting effect on the SME real exchange rate
dynamics.)
TABLE 1. Baseline parameterization.
Parameter Values
b .99
q 0 (0.0001 if bargaining)








5.1. Baseline model calibration. Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter val-
ues for the model. To avoid arbitrary parameterization and therefore outcomes for
the model’s behavior, we calibrate the model to match long run stylized facts. First,
we discuss parameters that can be easily estimated or ﬁxed indepedently. Similar
to Aruoba, Waller, and Wright [2008], we calibrate a to match the target of labor
share in output, which is about 0.7 in the data [see also Aruoba, 2010]. We ﬁx
d = 0.1 as estimated in Heathcote and Perri [2002] for a two country model. Fol-
lowing Aruoba, Waller, and Wright [2008] and Aruoba [2010], we set s = 0.065
to match the long-run money demand semi-elasticity with respect to the nominal
interest rate, where money is deﬁned by M1 for the U.S.. The risk aversion pa-
rameters h and g imply that both U and u are natural log functions of X and q,
respectively. This restriction is required for the baseline model to have a balanced
growth path, since the per-period utility function is linearly separable in consump-
tion and leisure [see Waller, 2010]. The constant marginal taxes on capital, labor
and CM-consumption, (tK,tH,tX) = (0.548,0.242,0.069), are chosen as in Aruoba,24 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE
Waller, and Wright [2008]. The estimate of w is from Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland
[1994].
Second, wecalibratesimultaneouslytheremainingparameters(A,B,v) tomatch
the targets of proportion of hours worked, H, a measure of non-traded consump-
tion goods share in total consumption, NTS, and the long run capital output ratio,
K/Y. The value of H is roughly 0.33, which is standard. This value can be thought
of as pinning down the marginal utility of labour parameter A. B is calibrated, in
this model, to match a DM consumption (interpreted as a nontradable good in this
model) share of total consumption to be close to 0.50 for the U.S., a share estimated
by Stockman and Tesar [1995]. This is in contrast to the closed-economy models
in Aruoba, Waller, and Wright [2008] and Aruoba [2010], where intuitively, B is
calibrated to match the velocity of money. The target capital-output ratio, K/Y, is
2.23 in annual terms. Given other parameters, this ratio can be thought of as pin-
ning down the calibration for v from the Euler equation characterizing equilibrium
capital accumulation along the steady state path. The calibrated value of v > 1,
implies that the more capital is installed for use in the DM production, the lower
the cost of producing a unit of DM output q. By duality, this implies that capital is
a complementary input to labor effort in DM production.
In the baseline model, we assume that all the TFP levels (and their shocks), in
both CM and DM, are uncorrelated with each other [see also Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan, 2002]. In parameterizing the exogenous TFP autocorrelation parame-
ters (rZ,rZ) we borrow values from Heathcote and Perri [2002]. The money sup-
ply growth stochastic processes are the estimates from Schlagenhauf and Wrase
[1995].
6. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CYCLE FEATURES
In this section, we discuss the business cycle dynamics of the calibrated baseline
model. We report the quantitative predictions of our benchmark model relative
to a business cycle model with sticky prices [Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2002,
labelled CKM in the tables], and a real business cycle model of ? (HP in the tables).
As we can see from Table 2, the benchmark model can account for the volatilities
of the key business cycle data for the U.S. quite well. In particular, the model can
account for up to 90% of the consumption volatility, 80% of the volatility in do-
mestic investment, and about 90% of labor volatility. The model over-predicts the
nominal exchange rate volatility.
Overall, in terms of the nominal and real exchange rate volatilities, the model is
able to reproduce qualitatively the observation that both exchange rates are muchSEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 25
TABLE 2. Percentage standard deviation (relative to U.S. GDP).
Data Benchmark CKM HP
e 4.67 8.92 4.14-4.66 n.a.
RER 2.23-4.36 2.82 4.09-4.98 2.23
X 0.81-0.83 0.70 0.83-0.92 0.51-0.53
I 2.78-2.84 2.23 1.32-1.70 2.04-2.74
H 0.66-0.90 0.80 0.48-0.63 0.28-0.32
more volatile than U.S. GDP. As opposed to Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan [2002]
and Heathcote and Perri [2002], our benchmark model does not rely on large rela-
tive risk aversion parameters, sticky prices nor imperfections in international risk
sharing to generate volatility.9 Furthermore, in contrast to standard ﬂexible price
two-country CIA models [see Schlagenhauf and Wrase, 1995], which is the limit of
our baseline model when s = 0 (and this is different to the limiting economy where
s & 0), the CIA models are unable to reproduce any realistic volatilities in the real
and nominal exchange rates.
TABLE 3. First-order autocorrelations.
Data Benchmark CKM HP
e 0.86 0.66 0.46-0.69 n.a.
RER 0.83 0.68 0.48-0.69 n.a.
X 0.89 0.99 0.48-0.61 n.a.
I 0.91 0.92 0.47-0.60 n.a.
H 0.90 0.90 0.48-0.69 n.a.
Y 0.88 0.94 0.49-0.70 n.a.
In term of endogenous persistence in the model, we consider the ﬁrst order au-
tocorrelation coefﬁcients of the equilibrium processes in Table 3. In terms of con-
sumption in the traditional Walrasian (or RBC) sector of the model, investment,
labor allocation, and GDP, the model matches the empirical persistence in the data
very well. However, in terms of the real and nominal exchange rates, the model
under predicts the persistence observed in the data. However, the baseline model
is able to do just as well as the models of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan [2002],
without requiring any exogenous sticky-price assumption.
9On the other hand, the competitive equilibrium in our model features incomplete markets as a
result of idiosyncratic shocks to agent types each period as they enter the DM. Since there is a link
between the DM and CM outcomes via capital, not all consumption risk can be fully insured.26 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE
TABLE 4. Contemporaneous cross-correlations with GDP.
Data Benchmark CKM HP
RER 0.13 0.08 0.17-0.52 0.65
X 0.86 0.80 n.a. 0.92-0.96
I 0.95 0.98 n.a. 0.96-0.99
H 0.87 0.84 n.a. 0.97-0.99
As another test of the model’s empirical plausibility, we consider the relevant
business cycle co-movements in Table 4 (co-movement with U.S. GDP) and Table 4
(various other correlations).
The model predicts correctly a procyclical real exchange rate, consumption, in-
vestment and hours data. The strength of the correlations are very to that in the
data as well, except for the real exchange rate. In this case, the model can only
explain more than 50% of the correlation.
TABLE 5. Other contemporaneous correlations.
Data Benchmark CKM HP
(Y,Y) 0.60 0.26 0.43-0.58 0.17-0.24
(X,X) 0.38 0.29 0.48-0.50 0.65-0.85
(x,X/X) -0.35 0.33 1.00 n.a.
(RER,e) 0.99 0.96 0.75-0.88 n.a.
(RER, NX) 0.14 0.38 0.75-0.88 n.a.
In terms of the other correlations in the data, Table 4 shows that the model is able
to generate realistic cross-country output, and consumption correlations, that are
weakly positive. Moreover, the model is able to generate an real-nominal exchange
rate correlation that is very close to the data. The model is able to explain just under
50% of the mild positive correlation between the real exchange rate and net exports
in the data. What stands out is that the model breaks away from the Backus and
Smith [1993] puzzle–that relative consumption across countries is counterfactually
perfectly correlated with the real exchange rate. This is not surprising since now,
since our DM sector where the special good is assumed to be produced and traded
locally, behaves exactly a nontraded goods sector. This essentially breaks the per-
fect link between the real exchange rate and the real terms of trade induced by the
marginal rate of subsitution of consumption across countries in the traded goods
sector (even with complete international asset markets).SEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 27
7. INSPECTING THE MECHANISM
Now we will explain the mechanism in this model that contributes to the busi-
ness cycle properties of the benchmark model reported in Tables 2-5 and discussed
in Section 6.
There are two key assumptions in this model that depart from a frictionless mon-
etary business cycle model. One is indexed by the underlying DM matching fric-
tion, s, and the other, conditional on s 2 (0,1/2), indexes capital complementarity
in DM production, v. These, individually, are crucial to contributing to the dynam-
ics of the international real and nominal exchange rates, respectively, in the face of
total factor productivity and money supply growth differentials across countries.
We analyze each feature of the model separately, beginning with s.
7.1. Random matching trade friction, s. Consider the following broad-brush ex-
periment where all shocks to (z,z,y,y) are present. In Table 6, we take s from
the benchmark calibration of s = 0.065, holding all other calibrations constant, to
s = 0.26. We can see that the volatility of each key variable increases as s becomes
smaller (calibrated benchmark). In particular, we can almost double the volatility
on real (RER) and nominal (e) exchange rates, and also increase the persistence
of the variables. From this we make the following observation on the benchmark
model.
Result 1. Greater individual uncertainty in the DM, s, induces greater volatility in all
allocations and prices, namely the real and nominal exchange rates, in the DM and CM.
Moreover, it results in more persistence in the real and nominal exchange rates.
We can dissect this result into the contribution of s to the dynamics, in the face
of each TFP and money supply growth shocks. This exercise is reported in terms
of comparative impulse response functions in Figure 2 for a shock to Home TFP z,
and in Figure 3 for a shock to Home money supply growth y.
7.1.1. TFP shock and s. As in standard real-business-cycle models, here, a one-
percent positive shock to the Home TFP, given by z, has the following effects: (i) It
raises CM output directly and therefore agents income from renting out labor and
capital in the CM: zF(K, H); and (ii) It also raises the marginal products of labor,
zFH(K, H), and capital, zFk(K, H), directly.
Since there is no wealth effect on leisure (by quasilinearity of preferences), there
is only a substitution effect on leisure. Thus employment H increases. CM Con-
sumption X is a normal good, so it must increase with an increase in income. In28 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE
TABLE 6. Effects of random matching (s).

















order to smooth consumption across date (via capital accumulation K) and state-
and-date events (via international contingent money claims, B(s+js)), there will
be respectively, an increase in physical capital investment (on the ﬁnal goods de-
mand side) and demand for intermediate goods (on the ﬁnal goods supply side).
The latter must be consistent with movements in the terms of trade Pyf/Pyh, such
that any changes in net exports will be equal to the negative of the current account,
which measures the net real ﬂow of contingent claims between the countries. In
equilibrium, a relatively higher TFP at Home, creates a depreciation in the real ex-
change rate (i.e. an increase in real purchasing power of Home residents) and this
is consistent with a fall in the CM ﬁnal goods (normalized) price level ˆ p := 1/ ˆ f.
We can now explain how s contributes to the dynamics. We know from Lagos
and Wright [2005], that random matching frictions will induce individual uncer-
tainty ex-ante in the DM. This creates stochastic opportunities for traders (i.e. the
total measure of 2sk anonymous buyer and sellers) where they get to trade using
either money or credit. Hence this would result in a distribution of heterogenous
agents’ assets at the end of each DM. A smaller s, all else constant, induces greater
uncertainty for both buyers and sellers, and this results in larger responses in the
DM outcome q and price level ˆ f, and in H as s & 0, as seen in Figure 2. Intu-
itively, ex-post DM buyers have to now work harder in each period to rebalanceSEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 29
their money holdings. Given this larger risk to individual DM trading opportuni-
ties, capital investment, I, in each CM is now more responsive to a TFP shock, since
with greater probability, the additional return on a given amount of investment in
each current CM may not be realized in subsequent DM monetary or credit trades
with total measure 2s(1 k). However, an increased H and I response, also results
in less volatile CM consumption (X) response. All else constant, the latter, together
with more volatile ˆ f, would mean a less volatile nominal exchange rate (e). This is
evident from the global risk sharing condition in equation (50). Recall that this is
only part of the mechanism.
7.1.2. Monetary shock and s. Consider now a shock to Home money supply growth
y. This would raise q (not shown), and reduce the value of money ˆ f := 1/ ˆ p (see
Figure 3). All else constant, this tends to create a nominal depreciation of the Home
currency e, inducing the Home CM ﬁnal good producer to substitute away from
the relatively more expensive intermediate good yh, to increasing its demand for
the relatively cheaper yf.
However, now consider in equilibrium that the DM pricing outcome (51) must
also hold. Since the monetary shock in the DM affects the equilibrium pricing con-
dition (51) by raising the amount of money individuals bring into the DM, the mar-
ginal utility value of a expfyg-unit of Home currency in the left-hand-side of (51) –
i.e. A ˆ f/w(1 tH) must fall. We observe that employment H falls (so that real wage
would rise) to consistently offset the fall in CM marginal utility UX(X) of consump-
tion (X) – i.e. also satisfying equation (46). This results in less current production
in the CM intermediate goods sector and may have an effect on the terms of trade
opposite to the direct effect of a depreciation of e.
Underourbaselinecalibration, theequilibriumresponseissuchthat yh decreases
as Home the intermediate goods producer substitutes towards the imported inter-
mediate good component (see Figure 3).
Again, how does s contribute to the dynamics in the face of a money supply
growth shock? The effect on labor is opposite to that of a TFP shock. With money
balances at the start of each DM higher over time, individual (monetary trade)
buyers now have less need to rebalance their money holdings via labor (see Figure
3). This has then a smaller supply side effect on the intermediate goods production
channel outline previously. On the other hand, a smaller s also means that there
is a smaller probability that money has value as a medium of exchange in future
DM’s. In order to maintain some smoothing of consumption X across dates and
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(viz. also as a means of precautionary saving), then the value of money must fall by
more, i.e. ˆ p := 1/ ˆ f rises by more (see Figure 3). The effect on the nominal exchange
rate of s is almost negligible.
7.1.3. All together now (s reprise). Now combining the analysis in the last two sec-
tions, and recalling, that a similar analysis is to be done for shock to Foreign TFP z
and money supply growth y, we obtain the net result in Table 6.
7.2. DM Capital complementarity, v. Conditional on s 2 (0,1/2], we now eluci-
date on the role the second feature of the model – capital complementary in DM
production. This is indexed by the parameter v. As before, we ﬁrst report an
overall result of a experiment where we consider taking v = 1.373 in the baseline
calibration to v = 1 holding all else in the model constant. The experiment thus
looks at the limit in which capital is not employed in the DM. Again all primitive
shocks are present in this overall result, reported in Table 7.
TABLE 7. Effects of capital complementarity (v).

















Result 2. Conditional on the baseline calibration of s, greater capital complementarity in
the DM seller’s technology, v, induces greater volatility in the real and nominal exchange
rates. However, it results in lower persistence in the exchange rates.SEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 31
7.2.1. TFP shock and v. Consider ﬁrst a Home TFP shock, shown in Figure 4. The
mechanism in the baseline is the same as in the baseline case in the ﬁrst experiment
on s.
With a lower (or without) capital complementarity in the DM production, ex-
pected return on holding money (and investing in capital) in the CM is lower be-
cause cqK(q+,K+) < 0 (and scK(q+,K+)) for all measurable future realizations of
(q+,K+). From the equilibrium asset pricing relation, for example equation (41), in
terms of optimal capital accumulation, we can deduce that on average, the level of
K is lower. By the concavity of the production technologies, the expected marginal
product of capital will be more variable. Hence domestic investment will be more
variable and persistent. Then labor and prices will be more variable and persistent,
although relative cross-country consumption is less variable, but more persistent.
From equilibrium nominal exchange determination, it turns out that the nominal
exchange rate is more variable and but less persistent. The real exchange rate turns
out to be less volatile and persistent.
7.2.2. Monetary shock and v. Consider now money supply growth shocks, shown
in Figure 5. How does v contribute to the dynamics in the face of a money supply
growth shock? Consider ﬁrst the equilibrium condition on money demand, given
by the Euler equation (37). Now, a smaller v also means that money has lower
value as a medium of exchange in future DM’s, since gqK = cqK < 0, so that the
DM value of money as medium of exchange, given by the term skuq/gq will be
smaller on average. Given an increase in money supply growth, inﬂation tax on
money holdings is larger. Given uncertainty of realizing the payoff from holding
money in the DM, s, ex-ante in the CM, there will be more volatility in the pricing
outcome in the DM. This is observed in Figure 5 as a larger response of the price
levels and the CPI index. Then, consistent with the asset pricing relation (37), there
more smoothing of CM consumption relative to foreign consumption.
Note that as v = 1, we effectively have a dichotomy in the determination of real
and monetary outcomes in the model [see Aruoba and Wright, 2003]. This explains
why the impulse responses to a money supply growth shock has virtually no real
effects in Figure 5. That shows up as less variability in RER although, and the effect
of the change in v is almost negligible in the nominal exchange rate, suggesting
that most of the nominal exchange rate dynamics still comes from domestic real
and external shocks.32 P. GOMIS-PORQUERAS, T. KAM & J. LEE
7.2.3. All together now (v reprise). Again, combining the analysis in the last two
sections, and recalling that a similar analysis is to be done for shock to Foreign TFP
z and money supply growth y, we obtain the net result in Table 7.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper we develop a two-country global monetary economy where a mon-
etary equilibrium exists because of fundamental decentralized trade frictions – a
Lagos-Wright search and matching friction. In the decentralized markets (DM), the
terms of trade can be determined either by bargaining or by competitive price tak-
ing. We show that the baseline model (with DM price taking) is capable of generat-
ing quite realistic the real exchange rate volatility observed in the data. In constrast
to ﬂexible price CIA models [see e.g. Schlagenhauf and Wrase, 1995] which fail
at matching volatility and persistence of the exchange rates, our baseline model
is able to explain about 7/8 of the persistence in the exchange rates without re-
quiring ad-hoc assumptions of sticky prices nor additional real shocks as in Steins-
son [2008]. The key mechanisms lie in the underlying DM trading friction and a
primitive technological assumption – that capital is also a complementary input to
production in the DM. This creates an internal propagation mechanism by modify-
ing asset-pricing relations and relative price dynamics in the model. In continuing
work, we also explore how alternative DM pricing mechanisms alter the exchange
rate dynamics.
APPENDIX A. SME CHARACTERIZATION
Consider a simpliﬁcation of the model with k = 1 and tK = tX = tH = 0. Since
the processes (y) and (y) are bounded below by zero, this implies that nominal
variables, namely M, M, f and f will grow unboundedly. We can perform a
change of variables in the equilibrium conditions for nominal variables as follows.





, ˆ i(s) :=
i(s)
M(s )
, ˆ f(s) := f(s)M(s ),




ˆ Ph(s) = Ph(s)/M(s ), ˆ Pf(s) = Pf(s)/M(s ).SEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 33
Then our SME conditions can be equivalently written as follows. The Home and
Foreign money supply injection are respectively given as:
ˆ i(s) = exp(y)   1
ˆ i(s) = exp(y)   1









The Home resource constraint in equilibrium is given by
G(yh(s),yf(s)) = X(s) + K(s)   (1  d)K(s ). (48)
The Foreign resource constraint is given by
G(y
f(s),y
h(s)) = X(s) + K(s)   (1  d)K(s ). (49)
Complete international risk sharing entails















expfyg = g[q(s),K(s )]. (52)
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Note that capital and labor rental pricing functions are given by:
r(s) = ˆ f(s) ˆ Ph(s)  zFk[K(s ), H(s)], (57)
and
w(s) = ˆ f(s) ˆ Ph(s)  zFH[K(s ), H(s)], (58)
for Home, and
r(s) =
ˆ f(s) ˆ Pf(s)
e(s)
 zFk[K(s ), H(s)], (59)
and
w(s) =
ˆ f(s) ˆ Pf(s)
e(s)
 zFH[K(s ), H(s)], (60)
forForeign, wherewehavemadeuseofthelawofonepriceforintermediategoods.
Intermediate goods trade and market clearing are given by:
ˆ f(s) ˆ Ph(s) = Gyh[yh(s),yf(s)], (61)
and
ˆ f(s) ˆ Pf(s) = Gyf[yh(s),yf(s)]. (62)
for Home, and













for Foreign, where we have again made use of the law of one price for intermediate
goods.SEARCH-THEORETIC MONEY AND EXCHANGE RATES 35
Market clearing for intermediate goods are:
zF[K(s ), H(s)] = yh(s) + y
h(s) (65)
zF[K(s ), H(s)] = y
f(s) + yf(s). (66)
Deﬁnition 2. A stationary Markov monetary equilibrium (with decentralized bargaining)
is given by time-invariant functions of s, i.e.
(1) Consumption functions (X,X, H, H,q,q,yh,yf,y
f,y
h),
(2) Savings functions (K,K), and,
(3) Pricing functions (w,w,r,r, ˆ e, ˆ f, ˆ f, ˆ Ph, ˆ Py),
that induce bounded stochastic processes satisfying the recursions (46)-(66), for given poli-
cies (ˆ i(s), ˆ i(s),G(s),G(s)).
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FIGURE 2. Experiment 1: The role of s. Impulse responses of vari-
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FIGURE 3. Experiment 1: The role of s. Impulse responses of vari-
ables to 1% Home money-supply growth y increase: Experiment (-
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FIGURE 4. Experiment 2: The role of v. Impulse responses of vari-
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FIGURE 5. Experiment 2: The role of v. Impulse responses of vari-
ables to 1% Home money-supply growth y increase: Experiment (-
 -), Benchmark (-  -)
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